

Final Report

FATAL INJURY OF CHIEF OFFICER ONBOARD THE CONTAINER VESSEL EVER WISH AT SEA ON 23 OCTOBER 2025

TIB/MAI/CAS.213

Transport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore
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The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABS	American Bureau of Shipping
ASD	Able Seafarer Deck
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CO	Chief Officer
COSWP	Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers
CPR	Cardiopulmonary resuscitation
DOC	Document of Compliance (ISM related)
EW	Ever Wish
H	Hours
ISM	International Safety Management
MLC	The Maritime Labour Convention
MSI	Maritime Safety Information
OS	Ordinary Seaman
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Port State Control
RA	Risk Assessment
SMC	Safety Management Certificate
SMS	Safety Management System
STCW	The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers
3O	Third Officer

SYNOPSIS

On 23 October 2025, while enroute from the Port of Laem Chabang to Port of Kaohsiung, the Singapore registered container vessel, Ever Wish (EW), encountered rough sea swells. Two spare mooring ropes placed at the forecastle deck were not secured and covered. As a result of the rough sea conditions, one of the spare mooring ropes scattered on deck and got fouled inside the starboard anchor hawse pipe and was floating on the sea after passing through the starboard hawse pipe. The Chief Officer (CO-1) was concerned that the mooring rope might entangle the bow thruster and decided to recover it.

A team of six crew members, led by CO-1 attempted to clear the fouled mooring rope but was unsuccessful. CO-1 suspended the operation after a few unsuccessful attempts as the sea conditions were getting worse. While securing the worksite, a huge wave splashed onto the forecastle deck and struck all the six crew members. The six crew members sustained injuries after the impact. CO-1 succumbed to his injuries and died while the vessel was diverting to the nearest port for shore emergency medical treatment.

The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore classified the occurrence as a very serious marine casualty.

The investigation revealed that the rough sea conditions did not meet the criteria of heavy weather stated in the Company's safety management system procedures. As a result, the "Navigation in Heavy Weather" Checklist was not carried out and the spare mooring ropes were not secured, hawse pipe openings not covered and there was no risk assessment done for clearing of the fouled mooring rope from the hawse pipe.

The investigation also revealed that CO-1 and the team did not discuss the task of clearing the fouled mooring rope with the Master, or inform the officer of the watch. Hence, there was no discussion of altering the ship course to avoid heading to the direction of the sea swells or delaying the clearing of the task till safer sea conditions.

DETAILS OF VESSEL

Name	Ever Wish
IMO number	9950586
Flag registry	Singapore
Classification society	American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) ¹
Ship type	Container carrier
Delivered	13 May 2025
Owner / ISM Manager ²	EVERGREEN Marine Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd.
Hull	Steel
Gross tonnage	27145
Length overall	172.0m
Moulded breadth	32.2m
Moulded depth	17.0m
Engine power	MAN 6G60ME-C10.5, T-II, SMCR 14,737 kW x 89 RPM
Service speed	Single screw propeller, at about 19.78 knots



Ever Wish (Source: the Company)

¹ As per the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code), ABS was the Recognised Organisation (RO) for carrying out ISM audit and issuance of ISM related certificates, as well as for survey and issuance of other statutory certificates.

² The "ISM Manager" is referred to as the Company in this investigation report.

1 FACTUAL INFORMATION

All times used in this report Ship Mean Time, which is eight hours (H) ahead of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC+8H), unless otherwise stated.

1.1 Sequence of Events

1.1.1 At about 1312H on 19 October 2025, the Singapore-registered container carrier, Ever Wish (EW) departed Laem Chabang, Thailand, for the Port of Kaohsiung, Taiwan, with estimated time of arrival, at 2130H, on 24 October 2025.

1.1.2 On the morning of 23 October 2025, the Bosun and an Able Seafarer Deck (ASD-1) went on deck for safety rounds and noticed the two coiled spare mooring ropes³ placed on the wooden pallets at the forecastle deck had scattered on deck. One end of the spare mooring rope placed at the starboard side was found floating on the sea after passing through the starboard hawse pipe (see **Figure 1**). The duo attempted to pull up the spare mooring rope but was unsuccessful as it was stuck with the anchor and chain in the hawse pipe.




Figure 1 – View of the spare mooring rope inside the hawse pipe and the loose end floating on water surface (*Source: the Company*)

1.1.3 The duo returned to the accommodation and reported the observation to the Chief Officer (CO-1)⁴ and requested for more manpower to assist in recovering the fouled mooring rope from the hawse pipe. According to the Bosun, CO-1 was worried that the mooring rope could entangle the bow thruster (right below

³ The two spare mooring ropes were coiled and placed on each side of the forecastle, but they were not secured.

⁴ The chief officer responsible for shipboard operations onboard EW at the time of occurrence. There was another chief officer (CO-2) who joined the vessel in Laem Chabang and was shadowing CO-1 to take over the responsibilities of chief officer when CO-1 signed off in Kaohsiung.

the starboard anchor) and cause damage to the bow thruster.

- 1.1.4 At about 0820H, CO-1, together with the Bosun and ASD-1 went to the forecastle deck to check on the fouled mooring rope. Two attempts⁵ to clear the fouled mooring rope from the hawse pipe were unsuccessful. CO-1 then instructed the Bosun to walk back to the accommodation to request the officer of the watch, the Third Officer (3O) for additional manpower.
- 1.1.5 At about 0835H, two ASDs (ASD-2 and ASD-3) and an Ordinary Seaman (OS), who were cleaning the accommodation areas, were asked to assist in the clearing of the stuck mooring rope.
- 1.1.6 With six crew members available, CO-1 re-attempted to clear the fouled mooring rope (see **Figure 2**) by using the starboard side mooring winch. During the reattempting period, EW experienced heavy up and down pitch movements when navigating through the rough sea swells, which occasionally slammed the ship's bow.




Figure 2 – View of the incident site for clearing the stuck mooring rope
(Source: the Company)

- 1.1.7 After two more unsuccessful reattempts, CO-1 decided to suspend the operation in view of the unfavourable sea conditions. The team started to secure the worksite (secure the mooring winch and the other spare mooring

⁵ First attempt by the Bosun and ASD-1 and the second attempt was together with CO-1.

rope from loosening further).

- 1.1.8 At about 0931H, while the six crew members were securing the worksite, EW encountered a big sea swell which slammed heavily on the vessel's bow and resulted in a huge wave coming onto the forecastle deck, which struck and swept all six crew members.
- 1.1.9 ASD-3, who was near the remote control of the starboard mooring winch, managed to hold on to a guard rail of the winch control stand and suffered injuries (see paragraph 1.8 for the extent of crew's injuries). He looked around after the huge wave was over and saw ASD-1 and ASD-2 lying on the floor next to the guard rails of the starboard anchor hawse pipe, both seemed to suffer some injuries. The OS was lying on the floor in water (a pool of sea water remained on deck at the time), a few meters behind ASD-3 and seemed to sustain some injuries. CO-1 was lying down beneath the anchor chain in front of the gypsy, unconscious with his face up. The Bosun was found towards the port side and had also been injured on his left leg.
- 1.1.10 After the vessel had somewhat stabilised, the crew members (the three ASDs and OS) managed to recover from their respective positions. However, when ASD-2 checked on CO-1, CO-1 did not respond. With the assistance of ASD-2, ASD-3 carried CO-1 to a sheltered place behind the windbreaker⁶ at the starboard side of bay no.2. The injured ASD-1 and OS were also assisted to the same sheltered place.
- 1.1.11 Thereafter, ASD-3 returned to the accommodation and reported the incident to the OOW on the bridge and requested for help.
- 1.1.12 The OOW notified the Master and made a public address announcement for all crew to be mustered outside the ship office for the emergency.
- 1.1.13 At about 0945H, all crew mustered and the rescue operations commenced to bring all injured crew back from the forward sheltered area to the accommodation. The injured CO-1 was brought to the ship infirmary for first aid treatment including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) at about 1036H, he had a bleeding wound between his right neck and cheek. The crew attempted to stop the bleeding by applying compression. CO-1's body

⁶ Also often named as bow wind deflector or windshield. An aerodynamic structural design on the forward deck of container ships to reduce wind resistance on container stacked in the forwardmost bays on deck, to deflect wind around the bow reducing the drag.

temperature dropped to 30.6°C and blood pressure became unmeasurable and CO-1 remained unconscious. CPR continued to be administered on CO-1.

- 1.1.14 At about 1040H, the Master sought emergency radio medical advice. As guided remotely by the shore doctor, the crew continued CPR on CO-1 and applied compression to stop bleeding.
 - 1.1.15 At about 1140H, the Master diverted the vessel to a nearest port, Subic Bay, the Philippines, seeking shore medical treatment for the injured crew, including CO-1.
 - 1.1.16 At about 1240H, CO-1 lost his vital signs, and the body temperature lowered to 29.6°C. CO-1 was declared dead by the shore doctor.
 - 1.1.17 At about 0632H on 24 October 2025, the three seriously injured crew (ASD-1, ASD-2 and OS) and the body of CO-1 were transferred ashore by tugboat. While EW was drifting outside Subic Bay where the sea was calm, the stuck spare mooring rope was cleared by lowering the starboard anchor and recovered onboard.
- 1.2 The Ship
- 1.2.1 EW was a container carrier operating on the CTX Service⁷. At the time of the occurrence, EW carried a total of cargo 23,051.9 metric tonnes in 1,785 TEU⁸ containers, drawing a draft of forward 10.0m and aft 10.35m, in less than half a meter trim by stern.
 - 1.2.2 Due to the containers stacked on deck and the design of the windbreaker at the forward part of the ship, the watchkeeping officer on the bridge could not see the forecastle deck and activities at that location (see **Figure 3**)

⁷ Commercially named as the China-Thailand Express Service, with a pre-fixed port rotation of Shanghai, Ningbo, Hong Kong, Suhanoukville, Laem Chabang, Kaohsiung, Shekou, Laemchabang and back to Shanghai.

⁸ Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit.



Figure 3 – View from EW's bridge looking forward (*Source: the Company, photograph was not taken at the occurrence time, for illustration purpose*)

1.3 The Crew

1.3.1 The crew onboard EW were mainly from the People's Republic of China (PRC), with some from Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. All crew including the Master held valid STCW⁹ competency certificates required for their respective positions onboard. The working language onboard EW was English.

1.3.2 The qualification and experience of the Master, relevant officers and crew are tabulated in

1.3.3 **Table 1** below.

Designation onboard	Nationality	Age	Qualification	Duration onboard (Months)	In rank service (Years)	Service in Company (Years)	Working schedule onboard
Master	Taiwanese	46	COC – Master / STCW II/2, IV/2	1.3	3.1	9.5	On daywork ¹⁰
Chief Officer (CO-1)	PRC	39	COC – Chief Mate / STCW II/2, IV/2	5.1	2.6	6.6	0400H – 0800H 1600H – 2000H
Chief Officer (CO-2)	Vietnamese	35	COC – Chief Officer / STCW II/2, IV/2	0.2	6	1.4	0400H – 0800H 1600H – 2000H
Third Officer (3O)	PRC	25	COC – Third Mate / STCW II/1, IV/2	5.1	0.5	1.6	0800H – 1200H 2000H – 2400H

¹¹ The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers (or STCW), 1978 sets qualification standards for masters, officers and watch personnel on seagoing merchant ships.

¹⁰ Normally from 0800H to 1700H. The Master remained on call at any time if needed from any other crew onboard EW.

Bosun	PRC	55	Deck Rating as per STCW II/5	5.1	3.4	3.4	0800H – 1200H 1300H – 1700H
ASD-1	Filipino	41	Deck Rating as per STCW II/5	5.1	11.6	14.3	0800H – 1200H 1300H – 1700H
ASD-2	PRC	26	Deck Rating as per STCW II/4	5.1	0.8	1.7	0800H – 1200H 1300H – 1700H
ASD-3	PRC	32	Deck Rating as per STCW II/4	5.1	0.7	3.1	0800H – 1200H 1300H – 1700H
OS	PRC	26	Deck Rating as per STCW II/4	4.2	0.4	0.4	0800H – 1200H 1300H – 1700H

Table 1

- 1.3.4 The Master joined the Company in 2007 and had more than three years of ship command experience on container ships.
- 1.3.5 CO-1 was responsible for rostering duties/rest hours to deck crew, conducting risk assessments and preparing work permit for approval, when necessary, supervising deck works, training of deck crew, etc., in accordance with the Company's procedures.
- 1.3.6 CO-1 sailed as chief officer for more than two years on container ships in the Company and kept bridge navigational watch during sea passage. He was designated as the ship safety officer with the roles of promoting safety, carrying out health and safety inspection onboard. He would conduct investigations when an unsafe act or unsafe condition was observed during his inspection, when reported by other crew members, or when an accident or a near miss occurred.
- 1.3.7 CO-1 was medically certified fit for sea service without any restrictions according to a health examination conducted prior to joining vessel, on 20 March 2025.
- 1.3.8 The Bosun joined the Company in 2021 and had already served five contracts. The Bosun would follow instructions given by the chief officer, or any duty officer and led the deck crew in carrying out tasks assigned. One of the daily tasks was to check container lashing and deck equipment working condition. The Bosun was also responsible for supervising, training and evaluating deck crew under his supervision.

- 1.3.9 There were five Able Seafarer Decks onboard EW. Of the five, three were dayworkers without watchkeeping duties, who were involved in retrieving the fouled mooring rope at the forecastle deck on the occurrence day.
- 1.3.10 According to the shipboard work/rest hour records, CO-1 had rest periods of 14.5 hours in the past 24 hours and 109 hours in the past seven (7) days prior to the occurrence. The rest hours for the officers and other crew members were documented in compliance with the STCW and MLC Convention's requirements concerning the hours of work and rest¹¹.
- 1.4 The Spare Mooring Ropes
- 1.4.1 The two spare mooring ropes were of the same type, 24-strand polyester and nylon mixed rope, weighing about 520 kilograms, 200 meters in length, 64mm in diameter, with a minimum breaking load 85 tons.
- 1.4.2 Both mooring ropes were placed on the forecastle deck, in front of the windbreaker (see **Figure 4**) since the delivery of EW from the shipyard on 13 May 2025. Depending on the circumstance and/or environmental condition, masters could deploy one or two spare mooring ropes in addition to normal mooring arrangement¹² to secure the ship alongside at berth.

¹¹ STCW Chapter VIII and MLC, Reg 2.3 with regards to rest hour - Minimum hours of rest shall not be less than: i) 10 hours in any 24-hour period; and ii) 77 hours in any seven-day period. Hours of rest may be divided into no more than two periods, one of which shall be at least six hours in length, and the interval between consecutive periods of rest shall not exceed 14 hours.

¹² EW's normal mooring arrangement at forward station would be using three headlines and one back spring line. These four mooring ropes were fixedly stored on forward mooring drums. If a master deemed necessary, the spare mooring ropes would be deployed as an additional headline or back spring line.




Figure 4 – The original locations of the two spare mooring ropes
(Source: the Company)

1.4.3 According to the Master, at the end of unberthing from the last port, Laem Chabang, while CO-1 was still at the forward station, he had instructed CO-1 via walkie-talkie to secure all equipment and mooring lines¹³ at forward station before CO-1 stood down. The investigation team was informed that both spare mooring ropes were placed at the same location (see **Figure 5**) since the delivery of EW without any covers, on a wooden pallet secured to the handrail of the windbreaker by ropes.



Figure 5 – The spare mooring rope placed at starboard side
(Source: the Company, red annotations by TSIB)

¹³ The securing of equipment and mooring lines was referred to general house-keeping practice when departing a port, it did not specifically mean to be preparing for heavy weather ahead of the voyage.

1.4.4 According to the crew, the spare mooring rope placed at the starboard side could have scattered over the forecastle deck by the ship's motion. The spare mooring rope got fouled with the anchor and chain in the hawse pipe.

1.5 The Safety Management System

1.5.1 The Company managed a fleet of container ships. The Document of Compliance (DOC) was issued to the Company on 16 August 2022 by ABS after completing a verification audit on 16 August 2022. The DOC was valid till 28 October 2027. Prior to the occurrence, the last verification was carried out on 23 October 2024 to endorse the DOC.

1.5.2 An interim Safety Management Certificate (SMC) was issued to EW on 13 May 2025 with a 6-month validity till 11 November 2025. The full-term SMC was issued on 27 October 2025 by ABS after the completion of initial audit. The SMC was valid until 26 October 2030.

1.5.3 The last Port State Control (PSC) inspection was conducted at the Port of Shanghai, on 4 July 2025 with two deficiencies¹⁴ issued and were subsequently addressed. There was no Flag State Control inspection carried out onboard EW after its delivery on 13 May 2025.

1.5.4 As required by the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the Company carried out an internal audit onboard EW on 21 July 2025 while the vessel berthed at the Port of Kaohsiung. One of its audit objectives was to assess if the shipboard safety management system (SMS) complied with the ISM Code, and the effectiveness of implementing the Company's safety management procedures. There were no non-conformity and observation raised for the internal audit.

Heavy weather conditions

1.5.5 Heavy weather conditions are defined as Beaufort wind force scale (BF) 8 and/or wave height of 6 meters and above in the Company's SMS procedures. Navigating a vessel in such conditions were considered as a critical shipboard operation. A separate section in the Company's SMS procedures on navigation

¹⁴ Two deficiencies – 1) The EPIRB (Emergency Position Indicator Radio Beacon) battery expired, and incorrect ship's identification number documented in the EPIRB test report; and 2) the joint of the flexible connecting pipe on the leakage pipe of the fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system is disconnected. Corrective actions were taken by the ship crew and both deficiencies were closed.

in heavy weather conditions provided guidance to masters, which included a list of actions to be taken, such as securing all deck machineries, reducing ship speed and altering ship course to mitigate wave impact and complying with the 'Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist' (CK-0704-2).

1.5.6 Of all items, the 'Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist' included the following key actions to be taken relating to this occurrence:

- Has the master been informed (of the heavy weather)?
- Have all movable objects been secured on deck and particularly in the engine room, galley and storerooms?
- Have both (anchor chain) hawse pipes been tied up with covers and canvas to avoid sea water ingressing into the chain lockers?
- Have weather reports been continuously monitored?
- Have crewmembers been warned to avoid working on deck areas?
- Has good watchkeeping been maintained for safe navigation?

1.5.7 The weather conditions at the time of occurrence (see paragraph 1.9.1) did not meet the criteria defined in the Company's SMS procedures for "Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist". The SMS procedures were unclear whether performing tasks on deck was allowed in rough sea conditions which did not meet the criteria of heavy weather conditions, i.e. the wind force Beaufort less than 8 and/or wave height less than 6 meters.

Risk Assessment

1.5.8 In another section of the Company's SMS procedures on Risk Assessment (RA), it required an RA to be conducted and a Permit to Work (PTW) to be prepared prior to the commencement of a special shipboard operation. The special shipboard operation was pre-identified by the Company such as hot work, entering enclosed space, underwater operation, work aloft, etc.

1.5.9 Clearing a fouled mooring rope on deck in rough sea conditions was not in the list of special shipboard operations, therefore, there was no RA performed and PTW issued prior to clearing the fouled mooring rope on deck.

Voyage Planning

- 1.5.10 According to the Company's SMS procedures on Voyage Planning, master of the ship was responsible for the voyage planning. A detailed voyage plan was required to cover the entire voyage from berth to berth.
- 1.5.11 An overall appraisal of the intended voyage was required, based on all relevant information gathered for the planned voyage, such as radio navigational warnings, meteorological information and existing ships' routing and reporting systems, etc. When executing the planned passage, meteorological conditions and weather routing information were required to be taken into consideration to ensure safety navigation and environmental protection. The voyage plan was always available on the bridge to allow watchkeeping officers immediate access and reference to the details of the plan.

Monthly Safety Management Meeting

- 1.5.12 The Company's SMS procedures required its fleet of vessels to conduct a shipboard safety and health committee meeting monthly and recorded in the Shipboard Meeting Minutes. The meeting would be chaired by master and would review the follow-up actions taken raised in the previous meeting, any accidents or incidents happened during the month and suggestions for safety issues, etc.
- 1.5.13 The records of the Shipboard Meeting Minutes onboard EW for the last three months (August – October 2025) had been provided to the investigation team. All crew attended the last three meetings except CO-2 who joined EW later. In the meeting of August 2025, a case study¹⁵ on mooring lines caught in bow thruster during mooring operations was discussed and raised to all ship's crew for awareness.
- 1.5.14 The three Meeting Minutes onboard EW documented that the Master had reminded all ship crew to pay attention to their own safety at work, wear proper personal protective equipment and follow all safety steps to avoid personal injury. The last shipboard safety and health committee meeting was carried out on 3 October 2025.

¹⁵ During a berthing operation, a mooring line was lowered onto a mooring boat assisting in the mooring operation. While the boat was adjusting the line's lead direction, the mooring line was excessively slackened and entered water entangling in the bow thruster, rendered the bow thruster unusable for vessel berthing.

1.6 The Passage Plan

- 1.6.1 Ship's records indicated that the sea passage was planned prior to departing Laem Chabang on 19 October 2025 by the Second Officer. The passage plan was acknowledged by both COs, the Chief Engineer and 3O, and approved by the Master.
- 1.6.2 The passage plan documented that essential reference materials were used in the planning for the voyage between Laem Chabang and Kaohsiung, such as latest weather reports received from NAVTEX¹⁶, Inmarsat-C¹⁷ and weather facsimile (see **Figure 6**). The Company's contracted routing service provider, WNI, was also consulted.




Figure 6 – JMH weather fax¹⁸ - forecasted at 1200UTC, 22 October 2025, shown the gale warning and tropical depression (GW and TD, highlighted in rose colour) and EW's estimated position (Source: the Company, red symbol of ship added by TSIB)

¹⁶ Navigational telex (NAVTEX) provides navigational safety information, weather warning and forecasts relevant to vessels within specified coastal areas in a range of generally within 300-400 nautical miles.

¹⁷ The meteorologic weather forecast received as maritime safety information (MSI) from Inmarsat-C was not printed out by the watchkeeping officers onboard EW. The previous MSI messages would be automatically deleted when storage became full. The MSI messages received on 21, 22, and 23 October 2025 by Inmarsat-C were not available upon request by the investigation team.

¹⁸ Surface analysis weather chart produced by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMH), which provides detailed meteorological data, including high and low-pressure systems, fronts and isobars, specifically for the Asian Pacific region and primarily transmitted via radio fax.

1.6.3 On 18 October 2025, the Master requested routing advice and weather forecast information for the intended passage from Laem Chabang to Kaohsiung, with dates and times of departure and arrival given to the routing service provider. The routing service provider responded on the same day with recommended routes for the Master to consider. A developing tropical storm, namely 'Fengshen' and its forecasted tracks over the following days were highlighted to the Master for attention in relation to the planned passage (see **Figure 7**) on each day during the passage. Route 1 (sailing further eastly to stay away from the tropical storm) was selected by the Master with an intention to reduce the weather impact from the passing tropical storm. The likely sea waves to be encountered were about 4m high (yellow highlighted).




Figure 7 – Initial voyage plan issued at 0635UTC, 18 October 2025
(Source: WNI via the Company)

1.6.4 The passage plan prepared by 2O adopted the routing service provider's recommendation. Before departing Laem Chabang, the Master consulted the Chief Engineer and the two Chief Officers on operating and functioning of shipboard systems, fuel, fresh water, stores, ballast water condition and the status of on-going maintenance items. The securing of the spare mooring ropes placed at the forecastle deck was not mentioned by both the Chief

Officers during the discussion.

- 1.6.5 After departing Laem Chabang, the Master verbally briefed the deck watchkeeping officers about the expected weather conditions and authorised them to adjust the ship heading in the event rough seas were encountered, to reduce the impact to the ship.

1.7 Additional Information

- 1.7.1 According to the OOW (3O), while keeping navigational watch on the bridge, he received a call from the Bosun requesting for additional manpower and ASD-2 to go to the forecastle deck, as instructed by CO-1, without indicating the type of work to be performed or reasons for additional manpower. No query was made by the OOW regarding the nature of the work, and no warning about the rough sea conditions was communicated to the Bosun at the time.

- 1.7.2 According to the recollection of the injured crew, prior to the occurrence, the estimated positions of CO-1 and the other five crew members at the forecastle deck were marked on the ship's drawing (see **Figure 8**).




Figure 8 – Positions of the six crew members at the forecastle deck prior to the occurrence (*Source: the Company, annotation by TSIB*)

- 1.7.3 A CCTV camera installed on top of EW's foremast captured the moment where the wave splashed on to the forecastle deck (see **Figure 9 – right**). **Figure 9 left** shows the image of the sea about 10 minutes before the wave for comparison.



Figure 9 – (Left) Sea condition prior to the wave (0921H) and (Right) the wave splashing on the forecastle deck (0931H) on 23 October 2025
(Source: the Company)

- 1.7.4 To understand if the OOW had been changing ship course (heading) during the rough sea conditions, the investigation team requested for the past ship course data to be retrieved from the ship course recorder¹⁹ after the occurrence. However, when the ship crew tried to recover past ship course data, it was discovered that no past ship course data was saved in the ship course recorder since the vessel departed shipyard on 13 May 2025.
- 1.7.5 According to the Master, the ship course recorder onboard EW was a digital type (i.e. without thermal paper), which required manual set up for recording. In addition, to free up the memory space of the ship course recorder, the ship course data had to be transferred to micro secure digital (SD) cards every month. The ship officers stated that they had been transferring the ship course data each month and assumed that the data had been transferred properly. Nevertheless, when the ship course data was requested, the ship officers were unable to find the ship course data in the SD cards. It is unclear to the investigation team if the ship course data recording was not set up properly or the transfer of ship course data to the SD cards was not carried out properly. The investigation team noted this issue of ship course data had been addressed onboard EW and proper recordings and data transfer to SD cards since 28 October 2025 (see **Figure 10**)

¹⁹ The ship's course recorder is an essential navigational equipment (SOLAS, Chapter V, Safety of Navigation) that automatically and continuously plots a vessel's heading and changes over time, the heading input is received typically from the master gyro compass.




Figure 10 – Ship's heading recorded by the course recorder on 28 October 2025
(Source: the Company, red annotation by TSIB)

- 1.7.6 CO-1 and the five crew members did not bring portable radios (walkie-talkies) for communication with the bridge watchkeeping officer when they proceeded to the forecandle deck. The request for additional manpower and rescue assistance was made in person by walking back to the accommodation from the forecandle deck.
- 1.7.7 A post-incident PSC inspection was carried out on 24 October 2025, in Subic Bay, the Philippines after the fatal injury occurrence. Two deficiencies²⁰ were raised by the PSC. The corrective actions to close the two deficiencies were to conduct training and briefing to the crew onboard, with reference to the relevant procedures established by the Company and the guidance of “Safe Movement on Board Ship” of the COSWP²¹ during heavy weather. The training was to emphasise the need to secure all spare mooring ropes and loose items on deck before the commencement of the sea passage with heavy weather forecasted.

²⁰ Two deficiencies were: i) Crew work practices during underway and bad weather, unsafe; and ii) The safety management system as implemented onboard has failed to ensure the effectiveness of shipboard operation as evidence to the deficiency number 1. Both deficiencies were corrected by the Company and the crew onboard EW on 30 October 2025 and were subsequently closed.

²¹ Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers (COSWP) is not a mandatory publication for carriage on Singapore registered ships. The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (flag Administration) had issued a Shipping Circular (No.25 of 2017) – Carriage Onboard of Safe Working Practices Publications, indicating that, “...For SOLAS Convention ships (>500 GT), if the SMS makes reference to relevant safe working practices code/guidelines, a copy of these code/guidelines should be made available on board.” The COSWP is published by the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) provides best practice and guidance for improving health and safety on board ships.

1.8 The Death and Injury to the Crew

1.8.1 The cause of the death of CO-1 indicated on the death certificate²² was blunt cervicothoracic injury.

1.8.2 According to a medical report dated 24 October 2025, the following injuries were indicated for the five crew members, see **Table 2**.

Bosun	Injuries at front of left leg and left ankle and foot areas
ASD-1	Injuries at mid-chest and front of left leg areas
ASD-2	Injuries at right shoulder and front of left leg areas
ASD-3	Injuries at left face, front of left leg and ankle areas
OS	Fractured, injuries at right-chest, front of left leg and ankle areas

Table 2

1.9 Environmental Condition

1.9.1 The weather condition recorded in the ship's logbook indicated there was north-easterly winds about 28-33 knots (BF 7, near gale) at 0800H on 23 October 2025. The sea state was rough with swell heights at about 3-4m. The sky was overcast but the visibility was more than 6nm.

1.9.2 At the time of occurrence (at about 0930H on 23 October 2025), EW was sailing at latitude 18-47.7 N and longitude 119-37.2E, on a gyro heading of 013°, at a speed of 13.9 knots. There was no course alteration made at the time.

²² Issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General, the Philippines, on 4 November 2025.

2 ANALYSIS

2.1 The Occurrence

2.1.1 The CCTV camera installed on top of EW's foremast did not capture the actions of the six crew members at the forecastle deck at the time of occurrence. However, the CCTV footage showed that EW was experiencing rough seas splashing onto the forecastle deck prior to the occurrence.

2.1.2 EW was sailing through rough sea with 3-4m swells against its starboard bow causing up and down pitching movements. This could have caused the unsecured coiled spare mooring rope (200m in length and 64mm in diameter), at the starboard side to scatter on the forecastle deck. One end of the spare mooring rope went into the nearby hawse pipe and slipped through the starboard hawse pipe and ended in the sea.

2.1.3 Five attempts to recover the spare mooring rope out of the hawse pipe were carried out by the ship crew but were unsuccessful, even with the use of a mooring winch.

2.1.4 While CO-1 had suspended the operation due to the rough sea conditions, all six crew members suffered injuries after being struck by a huge wave which splashed onto the forecastle deck.

2.2 Securing Deck Items for Heavy Weather Conditions

2.2.1 Prior to departing Laem Chabang, the Master was advised of the weather information in relation to the planned passage, including the forecasted tracks of the tropical storm "Fengshen" on each day of the voyage, and warning about the likely 4m-high sea waves to be encountered during the passage.

2.2.2 Though the Master had instructed CO-1 to secure all equipment and mooring lines at the forward station at the end of unberthing from Laem Chabang, this instruction was meant to be of general house-keeping practice for departing every port, rather than preparation for "Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist". As such, the two spare mooring ropes were coiled on the wooden pallet at the forecastle deck without proper securing arrangements or covers to prevent them from getting loose and scattering on deck.

- 2.2.3 The Company's SMS procedures on "Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist" required several key actions to be taken, such as securing movable objects on deck and covering both anchor hawse pipes. However, the criteria for heavy weather conditions were wind force Beaufort 8 and/or wave height 6 metres and above. As the forecasted weather conditions did not meet any of these two criteria, the forecastle was not secured in accordance with the "Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist". Hence, the two spare mooring ropes were not properly secured and the openings of the two hawse pipes left uncovered. In addition, crew members were allowed to work on deck, as the heavy weather conditions were not met.
- 2.2.4 The occurrence highlights the importance of securing movable objects/items on deck even if the criteria of heavy weather conditions are not met. Crew members should be encouraged to exercise discretion in securing movable objects/items when rough sea conditions are forecasted, even if the heavy weather conditions criteria are not met.
- 2.3 Risk Assessment for Task on Deck During Rough Sea Conditions
- 2.3.1 The recovery of the fouled spare mooring rope from the hawse pipe on the forecastle deck was an adhoc task. While the rough sea conditions did not meet the criteria for "Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist", the risk of getting struck by the rough seas and personal injury should be assessed and identified by conducting a risk assessment (RA).
- 2.3.2 CO-1's concern about the spare mooring rope being trapped in the bow thruster was valid, nevertheless, the investigation team opined that better coordination could have prevented the tragic occurrence. For instance, Discussion with the Master or the OOW prior to proceeding on deck would have allowed for the consideration of safer alternatives. A better and safer approach, such as adjusting the ship course to avoid heading in the direction of the sea swells or delaying the clearing of the fouled mooring rope till safer sea conditions, might have been feasible.
- 2.3.3 This occurrence reiterates the importance of conducting RA for adhoc tasks on deck during rough sea conditions and the need to have close coordination for shipboard operations.

3 CONCLUSIONS

From the information gathered, the following findings are made. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

- 3.1 While EW was navigating through rough sea with 3-4m swells, the up and down pitch movements likely caused the unsecured coiled spare mooring rope placed at the starboard side to scatter on the forecastle deck. One end of the spare mooring rope ended up in the sea after slipping through the starboard hawse pipe.
- 3.2 CO-1, together with five crew members attempted to recover the spare mooring rope and found it stuck with the anchor and chain in the hawse pipe. A huge wave came onto the forecastle deck and struck all of them and resulted in their injuries during the securing of the worksite. CO-1 became unconscious and succumbed to his injuries while the vessel was diverting the nearest port.
- 3.3 The Company's SMS procedures on "Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist" required securing all movable objects on deck and covering both anchor hawse pipes. However, the forecasted weather conditions of BF 7 and sea swells of about 3-4 meters high did not meet the SMS criteria of heavy weather conditions which was defined as wind force Beaufort 8 and/or wave height 6 meters and above. As such, the "Navigation in Heavy Weather Checklist" was not carried out.
- 3.4 The Company's SMS procedures required RA and PTW when performing special shipboard operations. However, the task of clearing the fouled spare mooring rope from the hawse pipe on forecastle deck was not considered to be a special shipboard operation, there was no RA carried out and PTW issued for this task.
- 3.5 CO-1 and the team did not discuss with the Master or inform the OOW prior to going on deck to clear the fouled spare mooring rope. There was no ship course adjustment to avoid heading to the direction of the sea swells.

SAFETY ACTIONS

During the course of the investigation and through discussions with the investigation team, the following safety actions were initiated by the ISM Manager (EVERGREEN Marine Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd.):

- 4.1 After the occurrence, the Company issued a Safety Alert (D15-2025-052) on 11 December 2025 sharing this very serious marine casualty and lessons learned. In the Safety Alert, the Company issued a list of instructions to guide its fleet of vessels, as follows:
- a) Master of vessel shall proactively assess weather conditions through weather fax, warnings from INM-C and NAVTEX, and advice from weather service providers such as WNI, and then issue clear instructions to the crew regarding heavy weather while the vessel is underway, at berth, or at anchor, in order to properly protect the safety of the crew, the vessel, and the cargo.
 - b) Chief Officer shall assess risks prior to work, and carefully monitor potential risks when weather conditions deteriorate during the period of operation. Chief Officer or site supervisor shall monitor any changes in environmental conditions that might alter the hazards and controls in place. If the risks could not be reduced by control measures, and possibly jeopardize crew's safety, the work should be stopped until the acceptable level of risk can be attained.
 - c) Chief Officer or the site supervisor shall establish communication with the officer of watch (OOW) on the bridge when there are concerns of heavy weather and conduct a walkie-talkie radio check before commencing the work. The work content, location, and number of crew involved shall be mentioned in the communication. When the weather deteriorates, OOW shall proactively alert the chief officer or the site supervisor of the situation.
 - d) If an operation is urgently required, necessary risk control measures should be fully considered in advance and during the operation, such as ship course alteration or speed reduction, to prevent or mitigate potential casualties and weather damage to the ship and cargo.
 - e) Spare mooring ropes on deck should be well stored or secured when the ship is oceangoing. The said mooring line may be stored in the Bosun

store, mooring rope locker, seats with storage crate or bracket on deck, or other place with secured means to strong points on deck, to prevent it from becoming loose on deck.

4.2 Additionally, the Company had reviewed its existing SMS procedures and carried out following:

- a) Introduced a new procedure - Routine Maintenance and Inspection on Deck, to guide its fleet of vessels on how a routine maintenance and inspection on open deck such as clearing fouled mooring rope shall be conducted, especially when the environmental, navigational, and operational condition affects the safety of crew. Required risk evaluation and safety measures mentioned in the Safety Alert instructions have been incorporated in this procedure. The procedure also states the deck work to be suspended immediately when any one of the following meets:
 - i. Wind force, swell height or wave impact increases to unsafe levels
 - ii. Wave washing observed on deck
 - iii. Vessel rolling reaches unsafe levels
 - iv. environmental conditions changed from those pre-identified and approved during the risk assessment
 - v. When in doubt, the deck work shall be stopped
- b) Revised the critical shipboard operation procedure, to require Chief Officer to conduct a risk assessment before assigning deck work when the vessel sails in areas where weather and sea conditions potentially deteriorate, even if the prevailing conditions have not reached the criteria of “heavy weather conditions” (wind force Beaufort 8 and/or wave height 6 meters and above).

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

A safety recommendation is for the purpose of preventive action and shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability.

In view of the safety actions taken by the Company [the ISM Manager, EVERGREEN Marine Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd.], no safety recommendations were issued in relation to this occurrence.